I. Introduction
The empirical literature on the competitive effects of consummated petroleum mergers is limited and its conclusions are mixed. 1 The appropriate quantitative methodology to identify competitive effects is also debated among analysts.
Section II provides background on the transactions and on Northeast bulk supply conditions in gasoline and diesel. Section III identifies the key competitive issues raised by the transactions. Section IV describes our methodology and data, while Section V presents our empirical findings. Section VI summarizes.
II. Background.
A. The Transactions The mergers' possible competitive implications can be better appreciated with an overview of bulk supply conditions in the U.S. Northeast at the time of the transactions.
Bulk supply refers to refinery production and the transport of refined products to terminals by pipelines, tankers or barges. Here we focus on the two largest volume categories of refined products--gasoline and No. 2 distillates. http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/states/_seds.html http://www.eia.doe.gov/oil_gas/petroleum/data_publications/company_level_imports/cli.html http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_move_ptb_dc_R20-R10_mbbl_m.htm 15 Individual refinery production data are not publically available. The Northeast production for gasoline and distillates were estimated using EIA data on 2003 Northeast refinery capacity, capacity utilization rates, and product percentage yields. 16 Estimates are based on import data obtained from EIA. 2) Did gasoline or diesel prices along the Laurel Corridor go up after the mergers compared to prices at other Northeast locations?
3) Did gasoline or diesel prices in the Northeast increase post-merger relative to prices outside the Northeast?
IV. Methodology and Data.
The most common empirical strategy to identify merger price effects is some form of a difference-in-difference ("DID") estimator. 30 Prices in areas potentially affected by a merger ("treatment" areas) are compared to prices in unaffected areas ("control" areas) that have similar demand and cost changes as those in treatment areas.
Differences in the pre-and post-merger price difference between treatments and controls ideally identify merger effects because common cost and demand shocks are netted out. Barton and Sherman (1984) , Kim and Singal (1993), and Vita and Sacher (2001) . See Hastings (2004) , Hastings and Gilbert (2005) , Taylor and Hosken (2007) and Simpson and Taylor (2008) for examples involving petroleum industry mergers.
A. Baseline Model
We assume that the price of gasoline (or diesel fuel) in an affected area (p At ) can be explained by changes induced by Sunoco/El Paso and Valero/Premcor, seasonal effects (proxied by month dummies, D mt ), and time-specific supply and demand shocks ( t ) as described by equation (1) below. We make the usual assumption that the transactions are exogenous.
The prices in the control areas (p Ct ) are explained by a similar relationship described by equation (2) below:
To estimate the price effects of the transactions, we take the difference of equations (1) and (2) and estimate equation (3) below, which eliminates common, time-specific shocks ( t ).
11 (3) is autoregressive, we employ an AR(1) correction. 32 Estimates of α 1 and α 2 may be either positive or negative depending on whether the merger was anticompetitive or, on the other hand, led to lower prices due to merger-related efficiencies.
B. Control Areas
31 For example, there are regional differences in seasonal changes in gasoline prices, driven by such factors as pipeline constraints and summer/winter differences in formulations. 32 We use the Prais-Winsten correction for autocorrelation.
Identification of merger price effects requires common, time-specific supply and demand shocks ( t ) in treatment and control areas. If treatment and control areas instead experience persistently different demand or cost shocks, disentangling any merger price effects from any demand or cost changes is impossible. 33 Most of the variability in gasoline and diesel prices is attributable to changes in crude oil prices. Because refined product prices everywhere are similarly sensitive to crude oil price changes, choice of control area is not very critical to account for shocks related to crude. The bigger challenge is designating control areas that share other important cost and demand shocks affecting refining and bulk transport, including outages, capacity constraints, and changes in transportation charges or in the refiners' and marketers' opportunity costs in geographically allocating product. Areas close to a treatment area would more likely share these demand and costs shocks, but relatively close areas may be less than ideal controls because their prices might be impacted by a merger-related price change in a treatment area due to geographic arbitrage.
Acknowledging these tradeoffs, we use multiple, alternative control areas of varying proximity for each affected area to assess the robustness of our results. We have generally designated controls far away enough from affected areas such that price differences are unlikely to be arbitraged by consumers at the retail level or by distributors at wholesale who might divert tank trucks from terminals in a treatment area to terminals in a control area.
33 Not only should the areas experience the same shocks, but the pass through of the shocks from one price level to the next needs to be the same. See Simpson and Schmidt (2008) .
We also pair treatment and control areas with the same gasoline specification because time-specific shocks across different gasoline specifications may vary. 34 Arbitrage between our designated control and treatment areas at the bulk supply level might still occur. For example, in response to a merger-related price in the Northeast, Gulf refiners and other marketers might divert pipeline shipments to the Northeast from control areas that we have designated in the Southeast and Midwest.
However, we assume, that for any plausible merger-related output reduction in any affected Northeast location, any resulting arbitrage at the bulk supply level would be spread over such a broad area that any price effect in specific control areas is de minimus.
1. Northeast Controls for Philadelphia. We select Boston and Newark as controls to test whether Philadelphia post-merger prices changed relative to other Northeast locations. These three areas consistently used the same gasoline specification during the period--RFG North. 35 We also used Boston and Newark as controls in our diesel analysis, although diesel regulatory requirements were not similarly geographically differentiated. Though close enough to Philadelphia to raise some questions about its independence as a control due to tank truck arbitrage, Newark is of interest due to the FTC's conclusion that New York Harbor area prices would not increase after the Sun/El
Paso merger because of competition from imports and the two New York Harbor refiners. The same out-of-Northeast controls are used in the diesel analysis.
C. Merger Windows
Our analysis requires a pre-merger period sufficiently long to estimate pre-merger price relationships between treatment and control areas, and a post-merger period sufficiently long to allow firms to take advantage of any merger-related market power or efficiencies. The post-merger period cannot be so long, however, as to pick up nonmerger related changes in market conditions that might affect relative prices in treatment and control areas. In our baseline estimates we use a two year window prior to January 13, 2004, the day Sunoco/El Paso was consummated.
We assume that merger price effects may occur immediately upon consummation.
The Sunoco/El Paso post-merger window in our baseline estimates is twenty months, 
D. Measurement of Price
The mergers did not increase control of competing retail outlets and directly implicated competition only at the bulk supply level. As such, the transactions' primary effect should be upon wholesale prices. However, suitably disaggregated available data on wholesale gasoline and diesel prices are limited to wholesale rack prices: those prices paid by distributors at product terminals. Other wholesale prices, for which public data are more limited or totally unavailable, include bulk spot prices (arm's length, individual sales of large quantities of gasoline or diesel), refinery gate price (FOB prices for specified volumes or range of volumes set under negotiated contracts of various durations), dealer tank wagon prices (prices set by refiners and other marketers for delivery of gasoline and diesel to individual service stations), and internal transfer prices (for refiners and marketers who own and operate their own service stations). If merger-37 Some analysts have used a post-merger window beginning at a transaction's announcement date (GAO (2009)). We think a post-merger window beginning at the announcement date is unrealistic because of the uncertainty that the transaction will be completed due to either antitrust challenge or purely business related reasons and because of significant penalties should antitrust enforcers uncover any attempts to jointly control the merging firms prior to consummation. Such "gun jumping" may be detected during prospective review by antitrust authorities, and merging firms may be liable for penalties even if the merger itself goes unchallenged. Effects beginning sometime after consummation might be expected for several reasons. Refinery output slates are largely determined up to several months in advance as refiners seek to lock in crude oil and other input purchases. Pipeline nominations are also made on an advance basis, and some contracts with bulk purchasers may limit refiners' ability to adjust output immediately. Moreover, if post-merger collusion were a competitive concern, some time might pass before coordinating rivals reached a consensus on prices. Finally, even a longer period of time might be required for firms to capture any merger-related efficiency gains. related price effects vary across these different wholesale prices, basing the analysis just on rack prices may yield misleading results. The net effect of any changes across all wholesale prices should be reflected in retail prices, however. Consequently, we test for both retail and wholesale rack price effects.
Our price data comes from the Oil Price Information Service ("OPIS"). OPIS collects data on retail and wholesale rack prices for numerous areas. Rack prices consist of the daily average price for branded and unbranded gasoline and diesel at terminal locations based on OPIS' survey of terminal operators. OPIS' retail data is derived from service stations that accept corporate fleet cards. We use the OPIS constructed average retail price for specific OPIS-designated areas. OPIS calculates this price as the average price over all retail outlets in an area that report on a give day, e.g., all stations in the Pennsylvania portion of the Philadelphia area. While OPIS retail price data are among the best available, they do not represent a random sample of retail outlets, and not every outlet may report on every day.
OPIS' retail price includes taxes, but we remove all federal, state and local taxes.
We aggregate the daily data to the weekly level, in part to mitigate any changes in sample composition that might arise from day to day changes in the number and identity of reporting retail outlets. For comparability, we also aggregate daily wholesale prices to the weekly level by taking the weekly average of the daily average branded and (separately) the unbranded low wholesale OPIS prices. Coast refinery and pipeline infrastructure and resulted in large price spikes for refined products throughout the U.S, as well as temporarily widening price differences among geographic areas. To control for these hurricane effects, we include a week-specific dummy, and in our baseline estimates we designate the weeks from September 1 through the end of November 2005 as hurricane-affected. While we report results without the hurricane control below, we believe that estimates controlling for the hurricanes to be more probative. 39 We also later report on robustness checks in varying the duration of the hurricane affected period. deviation, and its minimum and maximum prices. Rows below in each grouping report the mean price difference between the treatment and control areas, this difference's standard deviation, and the minimum and maximum differences. For example, Philadelphia's mean (less tax) retail gasoline price was $1.62 per gallon over the period, ranging from a low of 60 cents per gallon to a high of $2.84. The mean difference in gasoline between Philadelphia and the control areas was no more than about 5 cpg, although there was considerable variation in the minimum and maximum differences across controls. Standard deviation of treatment/control price differences, as well as minimum and maximum treatment/control differences varied across pairings. For example, the standard deviations of Philadelphia-Boston and Philadelphia-Newark price differences (3.1 and 3.5 respectively) were smaller than those for the other Philadelphia controls of Fairfax (5.1), Louisville (11.2) and Houston (7.4).
V. Results

A. Descriptive Statistics
Table Two also shows that both branded and unbranded rack prices have smaller average treatment/control differences as compared to retail. Standard deviations of the differences in rack prices are also generally lower than those at retail, which is not surprising because the rack prices do not include variation in the retail markup.
Unbranded pricing differences are more volatile than the branded pricing differences as expected because unbranded prices typically react more to supply disruptions or shortages than branded prices. 40 The average price for the different gasoline specifications are in the order expected based on differences in refinery costs: the average branded conventional price (in Harrisburg) is about two cents per gallon less than boutique, low RVP conventional (Pittsburgh) and about five cents less than the average price of RFG (Philadelphia). 41 Diesel price relationships and standard deviations among treatment/control pairs are generally similar to those for gasoline, adjusting for the higher average price of diesel compared to gasoline.
B. Baseline Results. Table Three shows merger-related, retail price increases of about 3 cents per gallon in Philadelphia relative to Boston in both gasoline and diesel; a similar increase in Philadelphia diesel (but not in gasoline) relative to Newark was also found. Retail estimates using the outside of Northeast controls of Fairfax, Louisville and Houston were not significant, however. At rack, the Valero/Premcor transaction was estimated to have a significant positive effect upon Philadelphia branded diesel prices relative to Newark, while the estimated effect on Philadelphia unbranded diesel prices relative to Newark was significantly negative (and surprisingly large). Unbranded Philadelphia rack gasoline prices appeared to have risen relative to Newark post merger. Estimated Valero/Premcor rack price effects for all other treatment/control pairs were either insignificant or significant and negative.
C. Discussion and Robustness Checks
Identification of merger effects depends critically on choice of control areas.
Because no control is ideal, evaluating post merger effects using multiple alternatives is an important robustness check. Our baseline results provided 168 merger effects estimates. The vast majority (138 out of 168) was statistically insignificant, while 21
estimates were significant but negative. Only 9 estimates suggested a significant positive price increase, and just 3 of these were at retail. Thus the preponderance of evidence, based on a count of significant estimates among treatment/control pairings, suggest that the mergers were, at worst, competitively neutral.
Differences in the price relationship of the treatment and control areas caution against drawing inferences only from a count of significant results across control alternatives. Prices in treatment areas are more closely related to those in controls within the Northeast compared to outside controls. This pattern is consistent for the three price levels for both gasoline and diesel. As Table Two indicates, for example, the standard deviation of Philadelphia/Boston RFG price difference (3.1 at retail) is noticeably smaller than the standard deviation in the Philadelphia/Fairfax price difference (5.1), despite Fairfax and Philadelphia being closer geographically. Similarly, in conventional gasoline, Harrisburg retail prices are more closely related to those in Bangor, Maine than in Roanoke, Virginia (standard deviation in the difference from Bangor of 2.8, compared to 5.1 for the difference from Roanoke). We interpret these differences in the tightness of price relationships as indicating that, although both Gulf and foreign imports are shipped into the regions, imports are generally the more important of the two in determining Northeast prices. This finding is contrary to the FTC's assumption in evaluating these transactions, which as noted above, viewed Gulf product as the chief potential constraint of any anticompetitive behavior by Northeast refiners.
These considerations also imply that results with Northeast controls should be given greater weight in assessing the mergers' competitive effects. While the Northeast controls may not be ideal because their prices may be more likely affected by the transactions compared to out of the Northeast control area, the impact of any such effect should be to bias against finding significant, merger related effects. But Table Three reports a number of significant effects, including several positive estimates of between one and three cents per gallon for Philadelphia area prices. Because the results with Northeast controls may be more telling about the mergers' competitive effects, we focus our robustness checks on the regressions in Table Three. 1. Robustness and Timing Assumptions. We first apply robustness checks that vary our baseline timing assumptions on 1) the length of the pre-merger period, 2) the time when the mergers were assumed to affect prices, and 3) the duration of the hurricane-affected period. That the baseline merger estimates might be sensitive to timing assumptions is illustrated by Figure Two . Figure The extreme volatility in price differences during the hurricane period is particularly notable. Differences in other treatment and control prices exhibit similar volatility over the period of the data. Significantly positive retail price effects in the Philadelphia/Boston comparison in Valero/Premcor were also relatively robust. We found this result surprising in the absence of positive rack price effects, although, as discussed above, such an outcome might occur because not all wholesale prices are observed. As can be seen in Figure Two , the retail price of gasoline was increasing in Philadelphia relative to Boston in the premerger period. This trend is even more pronounced in the retail diesel data, but the causes for these trends are unclear. To further examine whether retail prices changed in Philadelphia, we re-ran the regressions with three other New England areas--Barnstable, Massachusetts, Portsmouth, New Hampshire and Providence, Rhode Island--as controls.
We did not detect any significant increase retail price of gasoline or diesel in Philadelphia after Valero/ Premcor relative to any of these three alternative control areas. 
Summary of Merger Effect Point Estimates
Tables Eight and Nine summarize our price change point estimates across both mergers. across all three price levels and across both fuels for inside and outside Northeast control regressions separately. As Table Eight shows, a minority of point estimates for the baseline model was positive in all instances. In all instances very few of these positive point estimates were strongly statistically significant. To the extent there were significantly positive estimates, these occurred only in regressions using inside Northeast controls and were most frequent in the unbranded regressions. As for the frequency distribution of point estimates, estimates between -1 and +1 cpg were most common followed by estimates ranging between -1 and -5 cpg. Big estimates-more than plus or minus 5 cpg, were very few in number. Table Nine compares We found little evidence that Northeast prices increased relative to prices outside the Northeast after the mergers controlling for the Hurricanes. If anything, relative prices in the Northeast, particularly for diesel, went down. 46 As an additional check on whether the post-merger prices in the Northeast changed relative to prices outside the Northeast, we examined New York Harbor and Gulf spot prices for both gasoline and diesel. Spot prices involve individual transactions on the order of thousands of barrels and occur at transfer points such as refineries, ports, and pipeline junctures. Spot prices are important determinants of wholesale rack prices, and rack prices are highly responsive to changes in spot prices.
47 Table Ten presents DID merger price effect estimates for New York Harbor spot prices (treatment) relative to Gulf spots (control) for conventional and RFG/RBOB gasoline and for diesel. Estimates without and the baseline hurricane control period are shown, along with estimates generated if a number of additional price spikes are excluded in addition to the hurricane period 48 As the Table shows, neither merger was associated 45 Considering the estimates for the two mergers separately yield broadly similar conclusions. One notable exception, however, is that the modal price change estimates in Sunoco/El Paso regressions were between -1 and +1 cpg, while the modal range in Valero/Premcor was between -1 and -5 cpg. 46 One exception was a marginally significant 1.4 cpg increase in Harrisburg's unbranded diesel rack prices relative to Charlottesville in Sunoco/El Paso. 47 FTC Katrina Report at 99. 48 We identified seven periods during the six years of data of positive and negative price spikes, each lasting between 2 and 5 weeks. The regressions reported in the bottom box of Table Ten remove Examining prices for gasoline and diesel at both the retail and wholesale levels, our findings across multiple treatment and control areas generally suggest that the transactions were at worst competitively neutral. A few results indicated that some unbranded rack prices may have increased relative to other Northeast prices after the mergers. However, this outcome was not robust across controls or assumptions, and these unbranded price increases were not accompanied by branded rack or retail price increases. Northeast prices did not generally increase relative to prices outside the Northeast after the transactions. Differences in the closeness of the price relationships between various treatment and control areas suggest that, contrary to the FTC's view at the time of the transactions, imports were generally more important in determining
Northeast prices-and in constraining any anticompetitive behavior by regional refiners-than shipments from the Gulf. Additional analysis of the relative importance of Gulf and import supply may be warranted, however.
Many factors affect gasoline and diesel prices. We suspect that the impact from petroleum mergers upon prices is likely to be small relative to many of these other factors. The success of the DID approach in disentangling merger impacts from other factors affecting prices depends critically upon selection of control areas. No single control is likely to be ideal. Identifying good controls with time-specific cost and supply shocks common to treatment areas may be particularly challenging for refinery mergers because such mergers may affect prices over a broad geographic area in which supply and demand conditions may vary. Evaluating possible merger effects with multiple, reasonably plausible, controls is clearly warranted under these circumstances. Our analysis also points out the necessity of controlling for supply shocks, such as hurricanes, which can differentially affect treatment and control areas. 
